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“Since you are so networked, they must pay you more” 
Networks and the Finance Wage Premium 
 
Abstract 
Existing literature has tried to explain the surging wage premium within the financial industry since the 1980s. A widely 
proposed explanation, increased number of skilled workers, was proven wrong by Metzker and Bohm in 2015, which 
started new speculations about the possible explanations for higher relative wages in finance. This study provides 
previously undocumented evidence about the relationship between executive connectedness and the finance wage 
premium. I use similar methods as Engleberg, Gao and Parsons (2013) for constructing each executive’s connectedness 
and find that executives in finance receive excess pay for their connections in comparison to other industries. Furthermore, 
I find that the networks of executives have a positive impact on firm performance in the financial sector but not in other 
sectors. My sample consists of 29,000 executives of large listed firms in the U.S. for the years 2000-2014. My results are 
robust for additional tests and controls. 
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I. Introduction 
Several authors have studied the extraordinary increase of relative pay within financial sector around the world during 
the last few decades (e.g. Frydman 2007; Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Philippon and Reshef, 2012 and Metzker and Bohm 
(2015). One of the prevailing theories studied suggests that financial deregulation in the 1980s increased the complexity 
of work in finance in relation to other industries boosting the demand for skill within finance (Philippon and Reshef, 
2012; Célérier and Vallée, 2015). Moreover, the increasing wages in finance started the discussion of potential “brain 
drain” into the financial industry in the 1990s since these talented individuals may have been more productive in other 
activities, such as innovation and development (Baumol, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).  Kneer (2013) further 
suggested that the financial deregulation and “brain drain” resulted in a reduction in productivity outside of the financial 
industry. 
Alleviating the worries about the talent flow towards finance, recent evidence from Metzker and Bohm (2015) suggests 
that the increase in the finance wage premium cannot be explained by the changing composition of talent. Even though 
the existing literature offers also other explanations for the potential reasons for surging wages, such as increased 
importance of superstar effect in the financial industry1 (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010), globalization and the increasing 
scale of financial institutions (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Metzker and Bohm, 2015), the skill-biased technological change 
(Katz and Murphy, 1992; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Metzker et al. 2015) and  financial innovation (Metzker 
et al. 2015) it is clear that the exact reasons for the surging finance wage premium have not been fully discovered.  
Engleberg, Gao and Parsons (2012) found that CEO’s personal connectedness is a strong predictor for her personal 
compensation as firms may be willing to compensate better-connected CEOs for access to their networks and information 
advantages that they have. Other social networks literature has also found that connectedness has an effect on executive’s 
compensation level and pay-for-performance sensitivity through compromised corporate governance (Kramarz and 
Thesmar, 2013; Nguyen, 2012; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Barnea and Guedj, 2009). Furthermore, management literature 
suggests executive’s networks especially important in professional services firms through social capital development and 
customer acquisition (Harris and Helfat 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu and Kochhar 2001). 
Apart from the exact mechanism, it is clear that executive connections are things firms are willing to compensate.  
                                                             
1 Bell and Van Reenen (2010) and Metzker and Bohm (2015) suggest that the superstar effect of CEOs (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) 
affects also outside of the top management in the financial industry (e.g. top performing managing directors) 
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In this study, I use U.S. executive compensation data and executives’ personal relations with other executives and 
directors at other companies to find out whether finance wage premium can be explained by the excess pay on personal 
connectedness. I refer to (overall) connectedness as a number of individual connections by each executive.  
To empirically test the hypothesis, I examine executive compensation of approximately 29,000 executives in large public 
firms in the U.S between 2000-2014. Following Engleberg, Gao and Parsons (2013) I construct my main explanatory 
variable, executive connectedness, by using BoardEx database that gathers biographical data on executives and directors. 
In line with Engleberg, Gao and Parsons (2013) I construct my measure of connectedness through the sum of each 
executives’ past university connections, affiliations with charitable and volunteer organisations and past or current 
business relationships. Furthermore, I divide overall connectedness to industry connectedness and out-of-industry 
connectedness as firms within the same industry are more likely to have more relevant information (Engleberg, et al. 
2013). In addition, I only include connections outside of the executive’s current firm. 
Consistent with the main hypothesis, I find that executives working in financial industry are better compensated for their 
connectedness in comparison to other industries. One additional connection in finance is worth slightly more than 8,000$ 
in annual pay, which is nearly a twice of the 4,000$ what non-finance receive. This suggest that either connections are 
more valuable in finance or executives are more effective at extracting rents from their employers in the financial industry. 
Similarly as Engleberg, et al. (2013) I find that the industry connections are more valuable than out-of-industry 
connections. Further, I find that industry connections are more valuable in finance than outside of finance. 
In addition, I find that the relative size of the network in finance has increased throughout the sample period and surpassed 
non-finance sector in 2014 with 5 connections and having 146 total connections on average. Similarly to Engleberg, et.al 
(2013), I find that the effect of connectedness on pay decreases as the number of connections increase. Additionally, I 
find that in finance the effect is larger than in other industries which suggest that it is harder for finance executives to 
increase their network’s value as number of connections increases. 
Finally, I investigate whether the executive connectedness has impact on firm performance or valuation and find that both 
executive industry and out-of-industry connectedness improves firm performance in financial sector but not in other 
industries. Furthermore, I find that connections within the same industry are more valuable than out-of-industry 
connections, which suggests that higher pay for industry connectedness can be justified with improved performance. 
On top of the key concentration areas, I find that the finance wage premium among top executives has significantly 
decreased after the financial crisis. In contrary to overall finance industry, the relative pay has not recovered from the 
drop of 2008-2009 on executive level.  These previously undocumented results are in line with predictions made by 
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Philippon and Rashef (2012), who suggested that if new regulations (Dodd-Frank act, Basel 3) were effectively 
implemented, the excess wages on finance might diminish or disappear.  
I make several contributions to existing social networks and executive compensation literature. Previously published 
research has discovered that connectedness has impact on the level of total compensation (Hallock, 1997; Hwang and 
Kim, 2009; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Furthermore, Engleberg, et al. (2013) found that CEOs are compensated for 
their networks. I extend these findings by arguing that connectedness is compensated also on non-CEO executive level.  
Moreover, I find that the relative size of the networks in finance has increased throughout the years 2000-2014, which 
suggests that a part of finance wage premium can be explained with the excess pay on connectedness. I also find that 
industry connections are especially valuable within the financial industry, which suggests that finance executives’ do not 
have skills as transferrable as executives in other industries. According to retention hypothesis presented by Liu, Nanda, 
Onal and Silveri (2018), lack of transferrable skills should decrease executive outside employment options, and thus 
diminish pay for luck2. 
Further contributing to compensation and social network literature, I find that executive connectedness, especially 
industry connectedness, has a positive impact on firm performance in the financial sector but not in other sectors. This 
suggests that executive connectedness within financial industry is based - at least to some extent - on pay–for-performance 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, 2000). 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I provide background for my data and variable construction and 
describe stylized facts about finance wage premium and executive social networks. Section III provides evidence on the 
link between networks and finance wage premium. Sector IV documents the effect of connectedness on firm performance. 
Sector V includes additional robustness checks and describes empirical issues and section VI offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. Data and Stylized facts 
II.A. Data and Variable Construction 
I use several different data sources to construct my variables and series below.  Return and pricing data are collected from 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) annual stock return files. Company fundamentals are gathered from 
                                                             
2 Empirical evidence suggests that executive compensation, in particular CEO compensation, is partly tied to industry-wide or 
market-wide returns, a practice that has been termed “pay for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006) 
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Compustat annual files and ExecuComp monthly files. CRSP and Compustat are merged through link file generated by 
CRSP.  
The biographic information of senior executives and directors is from BoardEx database by Management Diagnostic 
Limited, which is a private research company collecting social network data on company officials from U.S. and European 
public and large private companies. The database includes both inactive and active companies that have been traded 
between January 2000 and December 2014. BoardEx has information on various different facts about the specific 
executive, including the education, degree information, current employment status, past employment history, as well as 
roles in different social activities (foundations, charitable groups, club memberships among many others).  
BoardEx has very limited coverage of U.S public companies prior to 2000 which is why I focus on the period of 2000-
2014 which enables the effects of survivorship bias.  Other authors have also suffered from similar concerns (Engleberg, 
et al. 2013, Fracassi and Tate 2012, Lallanne and Seabright 2011) and chose a similar styled sample or decided to focus 
on one-year cross-sectional observations (Fernandes et al. 2008). I further gather several company-level corporate 
governance variables from BoardEx, including the number of independent directors, duality and coopted boards to control 
my test results from deviations in board and ownership structures that culd have significant effect on executive 
compensation (Boyd, 1994; Sanders, Carpernter, 1998, Core, Holthausen, Larcker, 1999).  
Furthermore, I collected compensation data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database that covers executives of 
companies in the S&P500, the S&P Midcap 400, and the S&P Smallcap. ExecuComp reports two summary  measures of 
executive pay, TDC1 and TDC2. TDC2 estimates the value of total compensation realized by the executive in a given 
year whereas TDC1 estimates the total compensation awarded in the specific year. TDC1 uses estimated value of ex ante 
stock options granted by using the Black-Scholes formula. Similarly as Kaplan and Rauh (2012) I use the TDC1 
compensation as it provides clearer picture of the compensation the company’s board planned to pay for executive in each 
given year. After that, I match the BoardEx data with the data gathered from Compustat and CRSP using the S&P’s 
Global Company Key (GVKEY), as well as individual specific Executive ID (ExecID). 
My matching resulted in 2,474 unique firms with 29,265 unique executives and 129,610 unique firm-year observation 
with compensation and connectedness available during 2000-2014. From these observations, the financial industry is 
represented with 368 unique firms with 4,408 unique executives and 18, 664 unique firm-year observations. 
Appendix B provides summary statistics on my connection -, compensation - and control variables in my sample. An 
executive has on average 92 connections, which are further divided into 21 industry connections and 110 out-of-industry 
connections on average. Substantially larger relative number of observations for industry connections decreases the 
 
 
7 
overall average in my sample. The standard deviation in each of the categories is also notable. Approximately 15% of 
executives in my sample have at least 200 connections. 3 
II.B. Finance Wage Premium 
I first show the overall development of finance wage premium in the United States by representing the historical 
development of the relative wages between finance and non-finance in 1929-2017. Further, I represent the development 
of finance wage premium among executives in my sample. 
I construct the historical time series by following Philippon and Rashef (2012) and building my full-time equivalent wages 
using Bureau Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Annual Industry Accounts of the U.S. Similarly as Philippon and Rashef (2012) 
I define the Finance wage premium as an average wage in the financial sector related to nonfarm private sector excluding 
the financial sector.          (1) 
௙ܹ௜௡ǡ௧ ൌ  ௙ܹ௜௡ǡ௧
௡ܹ௢௡௙௔௥௠ǡ௧
 
The financial sector consists of three subsectors: credit intermediation (banks, other saving institutions and companies 
that offer credit services, other finance industries (private equity, hedge funds, venture capital and securities) and 
insurance services. Similarly as Phillippon and Rashef (2012) I find that the relative wages have increased rapidly since 
the 1980s and the historical data has U-shape pattern for wages in 1929-2008 (Figure I). Nevertheless, I find that after the 
financial crisis the wage premium decreased slightly in 2008-2009 following by return to the pre-crisis level at 1.80 in 
2017. In addition, the employment share of finance has decreased since 1980s and is currently at 5.4% from the nonfarm 
private sector which is in line with analysis made by Metzker and Bohm (2015). They further argue that this is partly due 
to the technological change that has already automatized large number of routine middle-skilled jobs such as accountants 
and secretaries. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
For the executives, I construct my time series by dividing executives based on two-digit NAICS codes (North American 
Classification System. Similarly as for the overall development I only use executives working in nonfarm private sector 
and compare them to executives in the financial industry.4 In Figure 2 I represent distinctly the relative wage development 
for all executives, CEO’s and non-CEO executives, as Bell and Van Reenen (2013) and Philippon and Rashef (2012) 
                                                             
3 In undocumented calculations, I found that the average network for CEO is 115 which is close to the 117 CEO connections 
Engleberg, Gao and Parsons (2012) found in their research “The Price of the CEO’s Rolodex” 
4  Nonfarm private sector constitutes from public government, agriculture, private households and non-profit organization employees 
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have argued about the extreme wage polarization among top executives in Finance. I find that finance wage premium for 
executives has in fact been large especially between 2002-2007.  Furthermore, I find that the relative pay for finance 
executives has collapsed after the financial crisis in relation to other industries.  Moreover, when comparing the relative 
wage development between finance CEO’s and non-CEO executives to their non-finance peers we can further notice the 
drop has been even more dramatic for CEO’s within the financial industry.   
These findings suggest that the finance wage premium for CEO’s has disappeared after the financial crisis and wage 
premium for non-CEO executives has decreased substantially. These new findings are not opposite to evidence offered 
by Phillippon and Rashef (2012) in the U.S, Bell and Van Reenen (2013) in the UK and Engleberg, et al. (2015) in Sweden 
for couple of distinctive reasons: My sample constitutes of top executives that comprise 0.02% of the employees within 
finance industry whereas previous literature has concentrated mainly on top quartile, decile or percentile. Secondly, I 
have been able to test the development with more extensive time horizon, especially for post-crisis. Finally, I have used 
precise compensation data from ExecuComp, whereas most recent literature covering finance executive pay in the US 
have approximated top wages using US Industry Accounts (Philippon and Rashef 2012) or CPS data (Metzker and Bohm 
2012).  
This radical decrease in the finance wage premium can be reasoned through the financial re-regulation (Dodd-Frank, 
Basel 3), as several authors have found evidence of a strong link between the financial deregulation and increasing relative 
wages in the financial industry (Philippon and Reshef, 2012; Bell and Van Reenen 2014; Boustanifar, Grant et al. 2017). 
Consistently, I find that relative wages for executives have not recovered from the crisis unlike it has happened for the 
overall industry (Engleberg, et al. 2012). However, my findings are not fully generalizable as ExecuComp data obscures 
the fact that there are a lot of highly paid professional within the financial firms that are not among top executives (Kaplan 
and Rauh, 2009).  
Insert Figure 2 here 
II.C. Executive Network  
My primary explanation for finance wage premium is based on larger pay for executive’s connectedness in finance. Social 
networks literature has discovered that connections increase the pay for executives (Engleberg, Gao and Parsons 2012; 
Lalanne and Seabright, 2011; Nquyen, 2012; Liu, 2014, Liu, Nanda, Onal and Silveri, 2018). Following Engleberg, et al. 
(2012) and Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) I construct main explanatory variable of my interest, connectedness, 
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through executives past or current business relationships, affiliations with charitable or volunteer organization, as well as 
universities attended (Engleberg, Gao and Parsons 2013). The connections are divided into following three categories: 
Employment Connections: 
Individuals that share an employment connection in year t have worked in or served on the board of the same organization 
simultaneously or prior t. I exclude the connections to the individuals currently working within the same company as the 
executive as the employment connections can simply mirror the size of the management team and board of directors. 
Education Connections: 
Similarly as Cohen, et al. (2008) and Engleberg, et al. (2012) I infer an education connection between two individuals in 
each specific year t if they went same school and received same type of degree within year of each other during or prior 
the year t.5 Furthermore, I treat each satellite campus of the university systems like University of Texas, as a separate 
institution. In the case of missing campus name, I assume the school being the flagship campus. 
Social Activities Connections: 
For social activities connections such as involvement in charities, clubs and other non-profit organizations I follow 
Fracassi and Tate (2012) and require active participation of both individuals.6 This means that both individuals’ roles 
must exceed the membership, with the exception of social clubs. 
Connectedness Measures 
I measure the overall connectedness of the executive each given year by summing up each of the three types of connections 
the executive has with other executives and directors outside of the firm. I have reduced the impact of outliers by 
winsorizing the connectedness measure at the top and bottom percentiles. Furthermore, since the BoardEx coverage 
increases through time I have scaled the sum of each executive connections by the total number of executives and directors 
by BoardEx in year t. I have multiplied these measures by 1,000 to ease the analyses. Nevertheless, I have divided the 
connectedness further into two categories by following the Engleberg, et al. (2013) 
 
                                                             
5Following Cohen, Frazzini, Malloy (2008), we group degrees into six categories: (1). general undergraduate degrees such as BA and 
BS, (2). general Master’s degrees such as MA and MS, (3). Doctoral degrees, (4). MBA, (5). Law degrees and (6). Medical degrees. 
We do not consider common professional qualifications such as Certified Public Accountant ornon-degree conferring programs such 
as executive management programs. 
6Networks from social activities can also create value via non information-based channels, such as the granting of political favors (e.g., 
Faccio 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Bertrand et al. 2005). 
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Industry Connectedness:  
I construct industry connectedness similarly as overall connectedness but focus solely on connections within specific 
industry. I have classified the industries by using two-digit NAICS –code. Total industry connections are thus, the sum 
of each executive’s connections in a given year within industry. Similarly as for overall connections, I have scaled the 
connections by dividing the sum of industry connections by the total number of executives and directors within the 
specific industry by BoardEx in year t. As done with overall networks, I have multiplied the sum by 1,000 and winsorized 
the measure at the top and bottom percentiles. 
Out-of-Industry Connectedness 
Out-of-industry measures simply the connections outside of each firms’ industry. I construct this measure by subtracting 
each executives’ overall connectedness and industry connectedness and further scaling the results with the subtraction of 
total number of overall connections and industry connections. 
 
III. Networks and Finance Wage Premium 
To test the main hypothesis of increasing connectedness as an explaining factor for finance wage premium I examine four 
distinctive hypotheses. Empirical specifications can be found in the Appendix A. 
H-1: Average pay for connectedness is greater in the financial sector relative to the average pay for connectedness in the 
non-finance sector  
H-2: Average pay for connectedness increases over time in the financial sector relative to average pay for connectedness 
in the non-finance sector 
H-3: Average connectedness is greater in the financial sector relative to average connectedness in the non-finance sector 
H-4: Average connectedness increases over time in the financial sector relative to average connectedness in the non-
finance sector  
III.A. Is the Connectedness Better Compensated in Finance? 
III.A.I. Overall Connectedness 
To test the first hypothesis I begin by running linear mixed-effect regressions, where I use executive pay (natural 
logarithm of TDC1) as the dependent variable. In Table 1, I regress each executive total compensation for her 
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connectedness. I include several standard controls, such as individual and company characteristics, as well as corporate 
governance controls and fixed-effects. The first column of the table proves the finance wage premium (Kaplan and Rauh, 
2010; Philippon and Rashef, 2012; Metzker and Bohm, 2015). Column 2 proves the additional pay for connectedness as 
well as for the connectedness in the financial industry and indicates that one connection adds approximately 4 000$ for 
annual compensation in non-finance. The equivalent for finance is approximately 8 000$.7 This is substantially lower than 
17 000$ Engleberg, et al. (2012) found only for CEOs between 2000-2007, however in undocumented robustness check 
I found similar result (15 000$) when testing with the equivalent sample and controls8. In column 3, I include company 
characteristics to the regression, which slightly decreases the coefficients of both overall networks and interaction between 
finance and networks. It is also notable that working in finance seems to lower executive’s compensation on its own. This 
is mostly explained by larger average total assets (natural logarithm) in the financial industry. Impacts of the networks 
in finance and in non-finance to compensation do not change substantially when adding industry fixed-effects. In column 
5, I added the squared term of networks and the interaction between finance and networks. Both terms have a negative 
coefficient, indicating decreasing pay for connectedness in executive compensation regression. These findings are in line 
with Engleberg, et al. (2012).  Standard errors are clustered by firm to allow for unobserved firm-level shocks to executive 
pay to persist over time. Furthermore, this means that my standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity. 
Insert Table 1 here 
In unreported robustness check, I exclude insurance firms from the sample (NAICS codes 524- ), following Kaplan and 
Rauh (2009), as they argue insurance companies as not “Wall Street” type firms that should be excluded from the sample. 
Similarly as Philippon and Rauh (2012), I find no significant difference when excluding insurance firms from the sample. 
Positive impact of interaction between finance and networks on compensation seemed even slightly stronger. In contrary, 
the core finance premium in columns 1 and 2 decreases slightly. 
III.A.II. Industry and Out of-Industry Connectedness 
In table 3, I divide the connectedness to industry and out-of-industry connectedness and regress each executive’s total 
compensation with these measures of connectedness separately. In column 1, we can see that the industry connections 
have a positive effect on executive compensation, which is logical since executives would appreciate information about 
her own industry. This indicates that either industry connections are considered to be more valuable in finance, or industry 
connections increase executive’s outside employment options and mobility in finance more than in other industries Liu, 
                                                             
7 Calculated from scaled networks 
8 Excluding idiosyncratic volatility and having executive age instead of her tenure 
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Nanda, Onal and Silveri (2018). Adding company characteristics and industry fixed-effects in column 2 decreases the 
effect of networks both in finance and non-finance, but networks in finance remain substantially more valuable. 
In column 3 we notice that out-of-industry connectedness has a positive effect on executive pay. The magnitude of the 
impact is similar with industry connectedness for both finance and non-finance industries but in finance the out-of-
industry connections are compensated less. Adding industry fixed-effects in the column 4 decreases pay for out-of-
industry networks in non-finance and makes the coefficient for the interaction insignificant.  
Insert Table 3 here 
III.B. Has the Average Pay for Connectedness Increased in Finance Over Time? 
To test the second hypothesis I first test how the finance wage premium has developed in 2000-2014. I regress the total 
compensation in finance by using year dummies. In column 1, we can see that the finance wage premium decreased a lot 
during the financial crisis. After the crisis, the premium recovered slightly but still remains at a lower level than prior to 
the crisis. However, large standard errors for coefficient during and after the crisis, when controlling only for individual 
characteristics (gender, age and CEO), suggest that these results are statistically insignificant. When adding the individual 
fixed-effects we can derive significant results also from 2007-2014. These results indicate that the finance wage premium 
coefficient has decreased to half from the levels prior crisis. Standard errors are clustered by firm-level to control for 
heteroscedasticity.  
Column 3, shows the yearly development of the finance network premium in 2000-2014 when controlled for individual 
characteristics, firm characteristics, year fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects. I find that over the sample period, 
networks in finance have consistently been more valuable than in non-finance. The premium decreases slightly during 
the financial crisis in 2008-2010 but results for the 2008 and 2009 are statistically insignificant. After the crisis, in 2011-
2013 we see that the pay for connectedness in the financial sector increased to a higher level than prior to the crisis. This 
suggests, again, that executives in finance are increasingly paid for their connectedness whereas the overall wage premium 
in comparison to other industries decreases.  
III.C. Is Finance More Connected Than Other Industries? 
If executives in Finance are paid more for each of their connection, it is worth to examine what is the size of the relative 
network in finance in comparison to non-finance. This enables us to distinct the effect of connectedness on compensation 
to relative quantity of connections and relative quality on each connection.  
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To test hypotheses 3 and 4 I construct time series for relative networks between finance and non-finance. I use data from 
BoardEx and calculate the connections similarly as Engleberg et al. (2012). Following Liu, et al. (2018), I have scaled 
yearly connections with the total number of connections in BoardEx database to make the time series comparable. 
Looking at Figure 3 we can see that relative wages in finance have historically been higher for finance executives than 
non-finance executives. However, relative connectedness in finance has increased since 2000 (0.77) and raises slightly 
above non-finance executives in 2014 (1.03). This suggests that demand for networks has risen in the financial industry 
in relation to other industries. There is also a significant difference between the connectedness of non-CEO executives 
and CEOs in finance, which suggests that non-CEO executive´s need to be more connected than CEOs to work in finance. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Looking at the development of connectedness within other industries in Table 4, we find that networks in Finance have 
grown at a yearly pace of 12.3% (Table 5) which is the second highest pace after Real Estate Rental and Leasing, when 
considering only industries with more than 1 000 observations. Executive’s average size of network in 2014 was 146 
connections. Comparable numbers for Information9 (189) and for Professional Services10 (175) suggest that 
connectedness among finance executives is still behind other industries with high human capital and income.  
Insert Table 5 here 
As a robustness check, I regress the connectedness with a finance dummy and different controls to examine how industry, 
company and individual characteristics affect to the level of connectedness (Table 6). In column 1, when controlling only 
for year fixed-effects I find similarly as Lalanne and Seabright (2011) that women have larger networks than men, and 
that CEOs are a lot more connected than non-CEO executives. The coefficients for these variables do not drastically 
change when including company characteristics, industry fixed-effects as well as firm fixed-effects in columns (2) – (4). 
However, after including these effects we find that company size (natural logarithm of assets) is an important determinant 
of executive connectedness similarly as (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Engleberg et al. 2012). 
Insert Table 6 here 
As a second robust check, I test whether external connections have an interaction between finance and year affect to 
connectedness on each observed year (Table 7). When having the fixed year effects in column 1 I find similar results as 
                                                             
9 Information industry in NAICS (code 51) includes Newspapers, Software Publishers, Motion Picture and Video Industries, Sound 
Recording Industries, Telecommunications, Data processing, Hosting and Related Services and Other Information Services. 
10 Professional services industry in NAICS (code 54) includes Legal Services, Accounting Services, Architectural and Engineering 
Services, Specialized Design Services, Computer System Design and Related Services, Consulting Services, Scientific Research and 
development services, advertising and public relations and other professional services. 
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in previous tests. Furthermore, the results after including firm-fixed effects in column 2 and individual effects in column 
3 support my findings that finance executives were more connected in 2014 than they had been during the whole 21st 
century. In undocumented robustness checks, I clustered the standard errors by firm and individual and found that my 
results are robust for heteroscedasticity. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
IV. Executive Connectedness and Firm Performance 
In this section, I investigate external connections effect on firm performance and further examine if the executives in 
finance are paid for their performance or they are only better at extracting rents from their employers. I report these results 
in Table 8. The dependent variable of my regressions is Tobin’s Q that measures firm’s performance or valuation. I lag 
all the independent variables by one year to model the causality of each year’s connectedness to the period I would expect 
the connectedness to have impact on firm performance. Furthermore, I control my regression for firm-specific R&D 
expenditures as several empirical studies have documented a positive impact between R&D investment and firm 
productivity and sales growth (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; Belderbos, Carree, Lokshin, 2004). 
Insert Table 8 here 
In column 1, I regress the whole sample of industry connections on Tobin’s Q, controlling for year- and firm fixed-effects 
and company characteristics similarly as Liu et al. (2018), I find that the coefficient of the interaction between finance 
and networks is positive which suggests that connectedness is more valuable for firms in finance than in other industries. 
In line with the findings of Liu, Nanda, Onal and Silveri, (2018), I find that overall connectedness is not statistically 
different from zero for non-finance sector that comprises most of my sample. As expected, the level of R&D has a large 
positive effect on a firm’s performance. In columns, 2 and 3 I divide the sample for industry connectedness and out-of 
industry connectedness. In column 2, I find that the industry connections have a positive impact on firm’s value in the 
financial industry and negative impact in other industries. These results are in line with Liu,et al. (2018) who found that 
industry connectedness has a negative impact on industries with low enforcement of non-compete clauses and positive 
for industries with high enforcement, such as the financial industry. Nevertheless, I find that the interaction between out-
of-the industry connections and finance is positive which indicates that firms benefit also from the connections their 
executives have outside of the financial industry. The impact on performance is, however, significantly lower than with 
industry connections. This might suggest that finance executives do not possess such transformable skills and knowledge 
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as other executives and thus they cannot benefit as much from connections and information outside of the financial 
industry. As an undocumented robustness check, I tested the financial industry and the non-financial industry separately, 
without the interaction term and R&D control. I found similar results, except that the positive impact of industry 
connectedness in finance had a smaller magnitude and was statistically insignificant. 
 
V. Additional Robustness Checks and Empirical Issues 
V.A. Additional Robustness Checks  
As an additional undocumented robustness check, I test whether the connectedness of executives in other industries has 
a positive impact on firm performance. I concentrated on executives working in professional services and information 
services14, as these industries have, similarly to finance, higher human capital than other industries on average (Metzker 
and Bohm, 2015). I find no significant results for the link between firm performance and executive connectedness in 
information services. In professional services, the executive’s out-of-industry connectedness seems to have a slightly 
negative impact on firm performance. These discoveries suggest that, the connectedness in the financial industry is 
especially valuable even in comparison to other skill-biased industries such as consultancies and software publishers. 
Furthermore, these results support the argument that the executives working in the financial industry are not having as 
transferrable skills as other industries which increases the firm performance through lower managerial mobility (Liu, et 
al. 2018). 
In addition, I tested the relationship between compensation and connectedness in finance when controlling for managerial 
ability -score which is a measure based on CEOs efficiency in generating revenue that was developed by Demerjian, Lev 
and McVay (2012). I find that when controlling for managerial ability, the coefficient for the interaction between finance 
and connectedness on compensation turns negative and insignificant when controlling for fixed year-effects. Results stay 
similar when controlling for other fixed-effects and other company controls and individual characteristics, such as age 
and gender of the executive. However, the results are not statistically significant. It is also hard to distinct the relationship 
between connectedness and managerial ability-score, which makes it impossible to draw any conclusions even with 
significant results.  
V.B. Empirical Issues  
One of my key contributions in this study is to examine the effect of executive connectedness on compensation. In doing 
so, it is important to realize the biggest strengths and weaknesses of my empirical methods.  
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One of my biggest strengths is that the data on executive networks and compensation is very detailed which give 
opportunities to run tests with variation. Furthermore, I have more extensive time period than previous authors that enables 
me to find more robust results. 
On the weaknesses, I have little meaningful time series variation in the size or composition of executive’s network. In 
other words, it is hard to distinguish how much the network measure is correlated with other executive attributes, firm 
attributes and/or firm-executive match quality. To conclude, I will be limited to establish the actual causal relations 
between networks, compensation, firm performance and working in finance or non-finance, but I am still able to do 
precise estimations about the distinctions between difference variables. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this study, I examine whether value and size of networks in the financial industry can explain the surging finance wage 
premium. In addition, I examine if the compensation on connectedness has impact on firm performance. The sample 
consist of 29,000 executives from large listed companies in the U.S. between 2000 and 2014. 
I find that executives working in the financial industry are better compensated for their connectedness than executives 
working in other industries, such as manufacturing and retail. One additional connection in finance is worth slightly more 
than 8,000$ in annual compensation, which is nearly twice as much as the 4,000$ outside finance. Furthermore, I find 
that the relative size of the networks within the financial industry has increased during the past 15 years. Moreover, I find 
similarly as Engleberg, et al. (2012) that connections within the same industry are likely to be more valuable than out-of-
industry connections. My results stay consistent when testing several different fixed-effects, company and individual 
controls, as well as corporate governance controls.  
In addition, I find a strong link between executive connectedness and firm performance in finance which suggests that 
connectedness within the financial sector is based on, at least to some extent, improved firm performance or valuation. In 
contrary, I find that connectedness in other industries does not a have significant effect on firm value, which could derive 
from better executive mobility and thus, improved outside employment options within senior management in other 
industries. (Liu, Nanda, Onal and Silveri, 2018) 
Finally, in previously undocumented evidence for finance wage premium, I find that relative pay for top executives in 
finance has decreased significantly after the financial crisis. Taking into consideration the increased financial regulation 
after the crisis, especially in the U.S and Europe (e.g. Dodd-Frank, Basel 3), my finding is in line with existing 
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compensation literature (Philippon and Rashef, 2012, Boustanifar, et al. 2017) which suggests low financial regulation as 
one of the key factors for the finance wage premium. 
Overall, this paper contributes to social network and compensation literature by offering networks as an evidence for 
finance wage premium. Furthermore, this paper offers evidence for the link between executive connectedness and 
improved firm performance within the financial sector. However, the findings in this paper are limited to a large, but 
restricted, sample of top executives in the United States, which highlights the need for further investigations with more 
comprehensive data. For future research, the findings of this paper present a new direction for researching the links 
between social capital, compensation and firm performance. 
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Table 3: Yearly Wage Premium and Compensation on Connectedness in Finance 
This table presents evidence on the effect of finance wage premium and effect on connectedness on compensation on yearly 
level in between 2000 and 2014. The dependent variable in all panels is natural logarithm of Total Direct Compensation awarded 
(TDC1). Column (1) describes yearly finance wage premium with only controlling for individual characteristics. Column (2) 
includes individual fixed-effects. Column (3) describes the yearly premium on finance connections with company- and corporate 
governance controls, individual characteristics controls (female, CEO and age) and yearly- and industry-fixed controls. Robust 
t-statistics clustered by firm are reported in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: BoardEx, ExecuComp, CRSP, 
Compustat 
  
 
 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Network x Finance
2000 0.135*** 0.185***
[0.035] [0.046]
2001 0.264*** 0.270*** 0.048*
[0.033] [0.044] [0.020]
2002 0.280*** 0.297*** 0.068***
[0.029] [0.044] [0.019]
2003 0.246*** 0.330*** 0.068***
[0.029] [0.044] [0.020]
2004 0.172*** 0.269*** 0.047**
[0.029] [0.044] [0.017]
2005 0.177*** 0.297*** 0.052**
[0.031] [0.043] [0.017]
2006 0.153*** 0.286*** 0.056**
[0.029] [0.043] [0.018]
2007 0.066* 0.207*** 0.058**
[0.027] [0.043] [0.022]
2008 -0.043 0.104* 0.033
[0.027] [0.043] [0.026]
2009 -0.019 0.132** 0.041
[0.027] [0.043] [0.021]
2010 -0.044 0.083 0.041*
[0.028] [0.043] [0.018]
2011 0.003 0.146*** 0.094**
[0.029] [0.043] [0.029]
2012 0.023 0.171*** 0.060**
[0.029] [0.043] [0.022]
2013 0.061 0.199*** 0.087***
[0.029] [0.043] [0.025]
2014 0.023* 0.161*** -0.188
[0.029] [0.044] [0.024]
Year fixed-effects No No Yes
Company controls (Table 1) No No Yes
Industry fixed-effects No No Yes
Individual fixed-effects No Yes No
Observations 87 208 87 208 74 623
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.791 0.570
Finance
Total compensation (Ln)
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Table 4: Executive Connectedness and Compensation within Different Industries 
This table provides evidence on the effect of executive connectedness on the level of executive in different industries. The 
dependent variable in all columns, is executive total direct compensation awarded (TDC1). For industry separation I use two-
digit NAICS-codes. All columns include year fixed-effects. Further column (2) include industry fixed-effects and column (3) 
company- and corporate governance controls. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets; ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Sources: BoardEx,  ExecuComp, CRSP, Compustat 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Finance 0.064*** 0.184*** 0.067***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Utilities 0.098*** 0.114*** 0.049***
[0.009] [0.013] [0.017]
Construction 0.076*** -0.030 -0.079***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.017]
Manufacturing 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.026***
[0.004] [0.008] [0.005]
Wholesale Trade -0.014 0.029** 0.000
[0.008] [0.010] [0.009]
Retail Trade 0.112*** 0.093*** 0.009
[0.010] [0.014] [0.008]
Transportation and Warehousing 0.616*** 0.352*** 0.065
[0.062] [0.094] [0.089]
Information 0.140*** 0.105*** 0.019***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Mining 0.154*** 0.045** -0.027*
[0.011] [0.014] [0.013]
Real Estate Rental and Leasing 0.025** 0.041*** 0.062***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.012]
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.025**
[0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
Adimistrative and Support and waste Mgmt 0.048*** 0.051*** -0.028
[0.010] [0.013] [0.012]
Educational Services -0.054** -0.012 -0.047
[0.010] [0.023] [0.019]
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.046*** 0.025 0.009
[0.013] [0.017] [0.015]
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation -0.003 -0.026 -0.017
[0.033] [0.042] [0.037]
Accommodation and Food services 0.094*** 0.039* 0.000
[0.012] [0.015] [0.014]
Other Services (except Public Administration) 0.001 0.073* 0.098***
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed-controls No Yes Yes
Company controls (Table 1) No No Yes
Observations 111 591 86 855 57 705
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.217 0.574
Total compensation (Ln)
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Table 7: Development of Executive Connectedness within the Financial Industry 
This table describes the development of executive connectedness within the financial industry. All the columns include year-
fixed effects and individual characteristics (female, CEO and age). Column (2) includes company characteristics and column (3) 
includes firm fixed-effects and individual fixed-effects. Since the BoardEx coverage increases through time, I have constructed 
comparable measure of connectedness by scaling each executive connections by the total number of executives and directors by 
BoardEx in year t. I have multiplied these measures by 1,000 to ease the analyses. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets; 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1. Sources: BoardEx, CRSP, Compustat 
 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.158*** 0.131***
[0.018] [0.017]
CEO 0.262*** 0.242*** 0.037***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.005]
Age -0.013*** -0.011*** 0.001*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.004]
Finance -0.426***
[0.081]
Finance x 2001 -0.011 0.038 0.039
[0.110] [0.102] [0.022]
Finance x 2002 0.239* 0.246* 0.092***
[0.111] [0.099] [0.023]
Finance x 2003 0.311** 0.332*** 0.175***
[0.105] [0.094] [0.022]
Finance x 2004 0.311** 0.316*** 0.181***
[0.104] [0.093] [0.022]
Finance x 2005 0.372*** 0.353*** 0.178***
[0.104] [0.094] [0.023]
Finance x 2006 0.356*** 0.288** 0.197***
[0.100] [0.083] [0.023]
Finance x 2007 0.399*** 0.286*** 0.212***
[0.091] [0.083] [0.022]
Finance x 2008 0.375*** 0.268** 0.206***
[0.091] [0.084] [0.022]
Finance x 2009 0.375*** 0.285*** 0.213***
[0.092] [0.084] [0.022]
Finance x 2010 0.427*** 0.321*** 0.216***
[0.092] [0.084] [0.022]
Finance x 2011 0.372*** 0.282*** 0.221***
[0.092] [0.084] [0.022]
Finance x 2012 0.373*** 0.294*** 0.224***
[0.092] [0.085] [0.023]
Finance x 2013 0.364*** 0.291*** 0.237***
[0.093] [0.085] [0.023]
Finance x 2014 0.397*** 0.335*** 0.262***
[0.093] [0.086] [0.022]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects No Yes Yes
Individual fixed-effects No No Yes
Observations 91 806 89 328 67 836
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.267 0.970
Connectedness (scaled)
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Appendix A: Empirical Specifications 
Following Lazear and Oyer (2010), I construct the executive i wage on time t and firm j as follows: 
(1) 
௜ܹǡ௧ǡ௝ = f (ܽ௜ǡ௧ ǡܤ௝ǡ௧ߔ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ሻ+ εi,j,t 
 
First argument represents generic executive attributes, a, into her compensation. These attributes can be intelligence, managerial 
skills, socials skills or anything else that are valued consistently across firms. The second argument, B, represents the effect of 
firm characteristics on executive productivity and compensation. The last argument stands for match quality that depends on 
both firm and executive’s characteristics. For example, large conglomerate could be a particularly good fit for executive with 
past international work experience. 
 
Assuming connectedness, c, as an individual attribute of generic executive attributes we can further specify the a, as follows 
(2) 
ܽ௜ǡ௧ ൌ  ܿ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ 
 
where, ܿ௜ǡ௧  represents executive connectedness, ݏ௜ǡ௧ , other executive generic attributes and ߝ௜ǡ௧ , individual-specific deviations 
from the mean.  
 
Following Metzker and Bohm (2015) I consider economy consisting of two sectors, the financial sector F and the Real sector R. 
Thus, generic attribute premium, P, in Finance at the time t can be presented as follows: 
(3) 
௧ܲ ൌ ൫ܿ௜ǡ௧ǡி െܿ௜ǡ௧ǡோ൯ ൅ ሺݏ௜ǡ௧ǡி െݏ௜ǡ௧ǡோሻ + (ߝ௜ǡ௧ǡி െ ߝ௜ǡ௧ǡோሻ 
 
Metzker and Bohm (2015) find that the cognitive and non-cognitive difference between workers in finance and non-finance 
industry has stayed similar throughout the time. I assume that this finding is generalizable also on executives. Taken that, 
differences in other executive generic attributes are consisting solely on cognitive and non-cognitive differences, C, we can 
derive the generic attribute premium in Finance as follows: 
(4) 
෠ܲ௧ ൌ ܥ ൅ ݏƸ௧ǡி െݏƸ௧ǡோ  
 
Further, taken that executive connectedness, s, can be a source of value through its quantity or quality, I can derive four distinctive 
ways the executive connectedness can be an explanatory factor for the finance wage premium:  
 
H-1: Average pay for connectedness is greater in the financial sector relative to the average pay for connectedness in the non-
finance sector: 
(5) 
௔ܹ ൌ ܥ ൅ ݏƸ௧ ൅ ݏƸ௧• F >ܥ ൅ ݏƸ௧  
 
Where ௔ܹ describes the compensation on executive generic attributes, F stands for the financial sector, ݏƸ௧  average pay for 
connectedness and ݏƸ௧ ȈF the interaction between connectedness and working in finance sector 
 
 
H-2: Average pay for connectedness increases over time in the financial sector relative to average pay for connectedness in the 
non-finance sector 
(6)  
ܨ௧ାଵ
ܨ௧ ൐ ͳ 
 
H-3: Average connectedness is greater in the financial sector relative to average connectedness in the non-finance sector 
(7) 
ݏƸ௧ǡி ൐ ݏƸ௧ǡோ 
 
 
H-4: Average connectedness increases over time in the financial sector relative to average connectedness in the non-finance 
sector 
(8) 
ሺݏƸ௧ାଵǡி െݏƸ௧ାଵǡோሻ ൐ ሺݏƸ௧ǡி െ ݏƸ௧ǡோ) 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics on variables used in my empirical analyses. Panels A and B presents the statistics on 
general and within-industry connectedness measures for executives s. Panel C provides statistics on compensation variables and 
Panel D on the other firm and industry characteristics that we use in the empirical analysis. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix C 
Panel A: Connectedness Measures N Mean Median Std Dev
Overall Connections (Unscaled) 121 647 91.542 37.000 145.862
Overall Connectedness 121 647 1.069 0.428 1.523
Industry Connections (Unscaled) 127 320 20.530 14.000 20.524
Industry Connectedness 127 320 32.822 17.497 46.790
Out-of-industry Connections (Unscaled) 75 346 110.165 51.000 138.845
Out-of-industry Connectedness 75 346 1.270 0.586 1.617
Panel B: Compensation Variables
Salary 144 630 438.776 372.692 247.683
Ln (Salary) 144 630 5.937 5.921 0.551
Bonus 69 883 445.513 513.966 3428.022
Ln (Bonus) 69 883 5.314 5.380 1.374
TDC1 133 557 2414.943 1392.248 2888.691
Ln (TDC1) 133 557 7.297 7.239 0.971
Panel C: Other Executive, Firm and Industry characteristics
1-year return 135 853 15.623 11.692 35.418
Prior two year returns 141 409 12.158 10.657 23.000
Mkt-to-book 135 069 6.758 2.265 320.040
Tangible_Assets 147 120 0.236 0.159 0.230
Total_Assets 147 120 17265.594 2142.527 95756.263
Ln (Total Assets) 147 120 7.807 7.669 1.748
PIB 147 124 0.354 0.000 0.478
Duality 147 124 0.538 1.000 0.499
Independent directors 147 124 0.754 0.786 0.150
Coopted 147 124 0.202 0.000 0.402
Overlap 147 124 0.208 0.125 0.240
Tobin's Q  t+1 139 025 1.266 0.913 1.289
R&D 60 587 0.064 0.041 0.075
MA-Score 86 820 -0.001 -0.0269 0.134
Age 107 131 52.836 53.000 7.733
Ln (Age) 107 131 3.957 3.970 0.147
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Appendix C: Definitions 
Variable Source Definition
Connectedness
General Connectedness BoardEx
Industry Connectedness BoardEx
Connectedness BoardEx
Relative network BoardEx
Non-Finance
BoardEx, Bureau of 
Financial Analysis
Compesation Variables
Cash Compensation ExecuComp
Option Grants ExecuComp
Restricted Stock Grants ExecuComp
TDC1 ExecuComp
Wage premium BoardEx, Bureau of 
Financial Analysis
Other Firm and Executive Characteristics
1-year return ExecuComp Annual percentage returns (dividends reinvested)
Prior two years return ExecuComp Two years cumulative returns (dividends reinvested)
Market-to-book Compustat/CRSP
Total Assets Compustat Book value of total assets
Tangible_Assets Compustat Plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PIB BoardEx Dummy variable that equals one if company has public Investment Board
Duality BoardEx
Independent directors BoardEx Number of independet directors divided by the total number of board members
Coopted BoardEx
Revenue Compustat Annual revenue of the fiscal year
Overlap BoardEx Overlapping directors
Tobin's Q Compustat
Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is at the same time chairman of the board
Proportion of board members that are appointed after the incumbent CEO
Sum of book debt and market value of equity divided by total of assets 
Value of restricted tok granted in the current fiscal year
Sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive
Market value of equity divided by the sum of book value of equity and
Average wage per employee/executive in Finance divided by the average wage per 
employee/executive in Non-Finance
Number of all Executive connections based on education, employment or social
activities, divided by the total number of executives and directors and multiplied by 1 000
Number of CEO connections within two-digit SIC industry based on
education, employment or social activities, divided by the total number of
executives and directors and multiplied by 1 000 
Sum of salary and bonus
Black-Scholes value of options granted in the current fiscal year
Average size of Finance executives network divided by average size of the Non-Finance 
executives network
Sum of General and Industry Connections
Employee working outside of the Finance Sector (NAICS code: 52)
